


The book was found

Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons From The Iranian Revolution And The Iraq War (Cornell Studies In Security Affairs Series)



Synopsis

The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In *Why Intelligence Fails*, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by the CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations - analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind - were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved. The book is published by Cornell University Press.

Book Information

Audible Audio Edition

Listening Length: 11 hours and 37 minutes

Program Type: Audiobook

Version: Unabridged

Publisher: University Press Audiobooks

Audible.com Release Date: April 24, 2013

Language: English

ASIN: B00CJO3V06

Best Sellers Rank: #177 in Books > Audible Audiobooks > History > Middle East #253

in Books > History > Middle East > Iran #268 in Books > History > Middle East > Iraq

Customer Reviews

Using two case studies, one about the fall of the Shah in Iran and the other about the WMD failures the author shows how and why intelligence organizations fail. The premise that he sells in this relatively short book (

Undoubtedly the most interesting portion of this very interesting book, is the CIA sponsored post-mortem report on why the Iranian Revolution caught CIA by surprise. Remarkably, this report is presented in full with very few redactions and includes the critiques of the report by senior CIA officials. As such it makes for fascinating reading. The brief given to Jervis (then a part time CIA consultant) and an unnamed CIA officer who was to assist in this work was to concentrate on the specific issue of the analytic tradecraft employed by CIA Iranian analysts prior to the revolution. On the whole Jervis and his shadowy assistant produced what appears to be a very fair report. This report concluded that given the information available to them, the two CIA political analysts assigned to Iran did a pretty credible job. One of these analysts was actually an Iranian target expert and Farsi linguist. Yet it is clear that these analysts took a very narrow view of their specialty and failed to place political events in the context of social and economic changes then effecting Iran. They also failed to make use of open source information on Iran or examine the strong Shia religious influences affecting Iran. As Jervis noted in his report what was then CIA's office of political analysis failed to communicate with its office of economic analysis. Further the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Iran failed to communicate with any of the analysts working Iran or to provide any guidance to them. Although his brief specifically did not include collection issues, Jervis also noted that the U.S. Embassy staff in Tehran (including CIA officers) included no Farsi speakers and did not have significant contacts outside of the Iranian Government. The CIA response to this report is quite illuminating if not surprising. They ignored his comments about lack of internal communication between the political and economic analyst, between CIA analysts and State INR analysts, and between the NIO and working analysts. They also ignored his comment about the cultural isolation of CIA officers in Tehran. They did however make a great deal of his general exoneration of CIA

analysts on the narrow grounds that the information they were using was quite limited. And of course there was a good deal of bureaucratic posturing to demonstrate that no one at CIA could be blamed for this failure. The second post-mortem that Jervis provides in this book that he did on his own dime, is a review of the notorious National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that argued that Saddam Hussein's Iraq had an active program for building Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). In this effort Jervis again makes a successful effort to present a fair and balanced account of how CIA produced such a completely incorrect NIE. In the course of doing so he provides very good discussions of the sensitive issue of political influence on intelligence production and conversely of the role of intelligence in policy formulation. This is a good book for intelligence aficionados and for anyone trying to understand how the U.S. intelligence system actually works.

[Download to continue reading...](#)

Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Series) Text Fails: 101 Epic Text Fails that Temporarily Ruined People's Lives (Autocorrect Fails) Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Emotional Intelligence: Why You're Smarter But They Are More Successful(Emotional intelligence leadership,Emotional Quotient,emotional intelligence depression,emotional intelligence workbook) Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America's Atomic Age (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Updated Edition (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Insider Threats (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) The Dictator's Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) Islamic Architecture in Iran: Poststructural Theory and the Architectural History of Iranian Mosques (International Library of Iranian Studies) Writing Classified and Unclassified Papers for National Security: A Scarecrow Professional Intelligence Education Series Manual (Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series) Social Security & Medicare Facts 2016: Social Security Coverage, Maximization Strategies for Social Security Benefits, Medicare/Medicaid, Social Security Taxes, Retirement & Disability, Ser Memes: Epic Fails & Funny Memes: (Memes, Fails, Jokes & Loads More Crazy Humor - Mega LOLs) Memes: WhatsApp Fails & Funny Memes: (Text Fails, Funny Jokes, Funny Books, Joke Books, Best Jokes XL) Emotional Intelligence: 3 Manuscripts - Emotional Intelligence Definitive Guide, Mastery, Complete Step by Step Guide (Social Engineering, Leadership, ... (Emotional Intelligence Series Book 4) Humanitarian Intelligence: A Practitioner's Guide to Crisis Analysis and Project Design (Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series) Ethics of Spying: A Reader

for the Intelligence Professional (Security and Professional Intelligence Education Series) The Iraq War: Rebuilding Iraq (American War Library) Soccernomics: Why England Loses, Why Spain, Germany, and Brazil Win, and Why the U.S., Japan, Australia—and Even Iraq—Are Destined to Become the Kings of the World’s Most Popular Sport

[Contact Us](#)

[DMCA](#)

[Privacy](#)

[FAQ & Help](#)